1 Introduction In computer question answering and problem solving programs many of the questions of modal and tense logics appear as practical design problems. One problem of particular interest appears when we allow events to have the truth value "unknown", a natural value to assign to some events which occur at other times than the present. However, allowing a third value is not as simple as it seems. Suppose that statements P and Q each have the truth value "unknown". What values should be assigned to {PΛQ)7 If (PvQ) is necessary, it should have the value "t r u e ", otherwise it has the value "unknown". The "m odal" composition of truth values cannot be achieved in a three ( "t r u e", "unknown", "false") valued truth functional logic. In fact, as shown by Dugundji [l], no finite valued truth functional logic can be given the modal interpretation. Consequently, semantic analysis of most modal systems must be quasi truth functional or involve infinite matrices or both. For example, Kripke [2] introduces the concept of a set of "possible worlds" with a model which assigns to each well formed formula (wff) a set of truth values, one for each world. If the set of worlds is infinite then each wff will have an infinite sequence for its value. F urthermore, the composition of truth values is not strictly truth functional since it depends on the "possibility" relation between worlds. Another example is the infinite product logic, πC 2 , where C 2 is the classical two valued propositional calculus [5] . In this logic wffs again have sequence for their values. These sequences can be viewed as the value a wff takes over time [3] and thus provide a link between modal logic and tense logic. A final example, out of many others, is the probabilistic approach as discussed by Rescher [4], [5] . He shows that assigning a probability to each wff and applying certain minimal features of a probability calculus yields a set of tautologies equivalent to the theorems of S5. H ere again the logic is infinite valued and quasi truth functional in the compositions.
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With a concern for computer applications such as question answering it seems appropriate to discuss yet another approach, which appears to have a simpler (though non truth functional) decision procedure while requiring
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only three truth values. The system discussed (called system C) is a propositional logic consisting of a set of rules defining derivability and a somewhat unusual evaluation scheme.
Two kinds of implication are defined in the system : a m aterial implication for which all the classical two valued tautologies hold, and a strict implication which satisfies all of the rules of S5, and in addition, the rule
This latter rule shows that C is a system of logical necessity only, unlike S5 which applies to other kinds of necessity as well. H owever, many of the so called "paradoxes of m aterial im plication " do not arise in C. This paper presen ts the system C and shows that its set of theorems and its set of tautologies are the sam e. 
read "p st rict ly equivalent to q" g) Jip = Dp read "p takes the value 1" h) Jip = ~Πp Λ ~Π~£ read "p takes the value \ " i) J o p = Π~p read "p takes the value 0"
The connectives J l9 J± , and J o (first used for a sim ilar reason by R o sser and Turquette [6] ) a r e introduced h ere to simplify the com pleten ess proof given in section 6. It should be noted that the values 0, | , and 1 were chosen to simplify the presentation. We could have used more meaningful names such as "fa lse " for 0, "unknown" or "in d et erm in at e" for |, and "t r u e " for 1.
In the usual way a C tautology is defined to be a wff which takes only the value 1 for every assignment of values to its component statement variables. (We write f = p if p is a C tautology.) Clearly then (by a) above) every two valued tautology is also a C tautology. F urth erm ore, such modal laws as p -* (p*p) will be seen to be C tautologies. H owever, the so called "paradoxes of m aterial im plication " do not arise in C, when we view " + " as strict implication. F or instance, although p =) (q 3 p) is a C tautology, P * (<ϊ * P) is not, since rule a) does not apply, and when both p and q are assigned the value |, p * (q -» p) takes the value \ .
4 C theorems In this section we present a set of rules (proper rule schemata and axiom schemata) which together with a definition of formal demonstration specify the theorem s of the system C. None of the rules is in its most primitive form (using only ~, v, and D ). H owever, expansion of an abbreviated wff is a straightforward procedure using the definitions of section 2. In what follows we shall use abbreviated forms for various reason s. H owever, it should be understood that when we speak of the length of a wff or occurren ces of a symbol in a wff that we refer to the prim itive form. Thus, we say that D occurs in both DA and in J ι A.
Cl \ A^> (B^>
We write ThA to indicate that A is derivable from the set of statements Γ, that is, there is a finite sequence (called a derivation) of wffs, D = (d l9 d 2 , . . ., dn) such that A = d n , and each di is an element of Γ, or is some dj in D such that j < i, or follows from some wffs in d l9 d 2 , . . ., <2 f i by rules C1 C9. If Γ is null we say that A is a theorem , or \ A. Where there is a chance for confusion we write v^A.
Rules C1 C3 and C4 (modus ponens) comprise a set of axioms for classical two valued logic, thus ensuring that b,A= # >ι^A. The addition of rules C5, C6, and C8 gives the modal system M. Adding C7 gives the system S5. C9 is the special axiom mentioned earlier which makes C a system of logical necessity.
1. Sobociήski [7] has shown that in the classical axiomatization of S5 the axiom C5 is redundant and hence it is redundant in the system C. 6 Every C tautology is a C theorem {Completeness) This section estab lish es som e t h eo rem s of C in o r d er to illu st rat e the system and then uses the t h eo rem s to prove the com pleten ess of C. T h is, togeth er with CS10 shows that th e given axiom atization of C (C1 C9) is com plete and sound relative to th e evaluation schem e given above. In th e proofs below, stan dard resu lt s a r e given in an abbreviated form (for exam ple, C1 C4 m ean s a th eorem of ordin ary two valued logic, C1 C8 m ean s a th eorem of the Lewis system S5).
CC1
hA ^B=Φ h A ^ ΠB 
CC18 \ O(AΛB) ^O(AvB)
Proof: 
It follows (by induction) that for each i = 1, 2, . . ., n, that F, is a derivation of A 3 <2; from Γ. Since d n is B, Y n is a derivation oi A^ B from Γ.
The com pleten ess th eorem follows directly from CC26 and CC27.
CC28 \ =A=^^A
Proof: Let A be a wff composed in th e usual way from the variables Th eorem CCS1 shows that the evaluation sch em e given above assign s the value 1, for all assign m en ts of values to the component variables, to th ose and only those wffs which a r e derivable from the axiom s C1 C9. Thus, the system C is complete and sound relative to the axiom s and evaluation schem e presen t ed.
C is an in terestin g system in several ways. As mentioned, it s st r ic t im plication operat or ( *) avoids many of the im plication paradoxes which a r e also avoided by the Lewis syst em s. F u r t h er m o r e , no G odel sequence (see [ l] o r [5] ) holds for the st ric t equivalence; that is, wffs of the form are not t h eo rem s. The reason that C is not a counter example to D ugundji's th eorem is that it is not a st rict ly truth functional logic; that is, no finite truth table could be con structed to replace it s evaluation sch em e.
It seems reasonable (although it has not been shown here) to expect that changing rule a) of the evaluation scheme so that "n ecessit ies" other than logical necessity are captured would make C equivalent to S5. As it stands, C is strictly stronger than S5 because of the axiom C9. Aside from any intrinsic interest C may hold as a system for purely logical necessity, it appears that its main value may be in computational areas. There are many efficient methods for checking for two valued tautologies, so the evaluation scheme should be easy to implement in a question answering system. The ' 'unknown'' truth value could then be assigned to certain future (or past) statements or events. Questions involving several events might then take the value "unknown", provided they were not tautologies.
